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LOUISIANA, LAW REVIEW
PARTICULAR CONTRACTS
J. Denson Smith*
Under established jurisprudence the common law conditional
sale is not recognized in Louisiana. This rule is not applied to
sales of immovables despite the fact that the agonized reasoning
of the organ of the court, in the leading case of Barber Asphalt
Co. v. St. Louis Cypress Co.,1 might lead to a contrary conclu-
sion. It seems clear that the Barber decision was actually aimed
at protecting, as a matter of policy, innocent third persons who
deal with a conditional vendee believing him to be the owner.
This purpose has no pertinency with respect to agreements cov-
ering immovables because of the requirement of registry. In St.
Landry Loan Co. v. Etienne2 the court of appeal properly re-
jected a contention that, because of the mentioned rule, a vendor
in a bond-for-deed contract may not reserve title in himself. As
the opinion explained, an act translative of title is necessary in
this state to vest in the vendee ownership of an immovable, i.e.,
the transfer of ownership is suspended pending delivery.8 A
bond-for-deed contract is not such an act. It reserves ownership
in the vendor pending payment of the stipulated portion of the
purchase price. As far as this writer knows, the validity of such
a reservation has never before been questioned. The subject of
bond-for-deed contracts will be discussed in a Comment in a
later issue of this Review.
It was held in Parnell v. Baham4 that ownership in twelve
second-hand automobiles had passed from a new car dealer to a
used car dealer notwithstanding- that the seller had retained
possession of the title certificates pending payment for the cars.
This result seems to be clearly correct on the facts. The issue was
posed by a personal injury claimant's attempt to recover under
the seller's automobile liability insurance on the ground that the
seller remained owner. The facts bear out the court's conclusion
that a credit transaction was intended; that there was in reality
no effort on the part of the seller to retain ownership. Even if
such an effort had been found, a strong argument could have
been made that this would have constituted an attempted con-
ditional sale, a transaction which, as noted above, is not recog-
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.'
1. 121 La. 152, 46 So. 193 (1908).
2. 227 So.2d 599 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
3. See LA. Cv. CODs art. 2479.
4. 228 So.2d 53 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969).
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nized in' the sale of movables in this state. Under the common
law, so-called "cash sales," where the seller intends to part with
his title only upon payment of the price in cash but makes de-
livery on the basis of a worthless check, were generally given
effect with the result that ownership would not pass until the
check was paid.5 Transactions of this kind were treated as con-
ditional sales unless there was some indication that credit was
indeed extended, as by the seller's taking a postdated check. In-
asmuch as we do not recognize a specific effort on the part of a
seller of a movable to retain ownership until the price is paid,
it seems to follow that the rule would apply to such an attempt
in the form of a sale, made subject to the suspensive condition of
payment of the total price immediately in cash, as well as to a
deliberately attempted and ordinary conditional sale. There is
indeed a decision, not free, however, from doubt, to the effect
that when a check is taken in payment the sale is on credit.6
This means that ownership passes, a result that might be ex-
plained by saying that we do not recognize conditional sales.
This writer finds himself in accord with the majority hold-
ing in Andrepont v. Acadia Drilling Co., Inc.7 that a surface
lessee was the beneficiary of a stipulation pour autrui in the form
of a promise by an oil and gas lessee to the landowner-lessor to
be "responsible for all damages caused by lessee's operations."
Common law authority apparently would agree inasmuch as
satisfaction of the obligation by the promisor would serve to dis-
charge the obligation of the promisee-lessor to cause the lessee
to be in peaceable possession of the premises during the continu-
ance of the lease.8 A complicating factor in Andrepont was the
absence of recordation of the surface lease. It appears that if the
oil lessee had expressly agreed to pay Andrepont, by name, for
any damage to his crop the absence 'of recordation of the surface
lease would not have rendered this promise ineffective. If this
be true, then the question before the court was merely whether
5. A contrary rule Is contained in UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-403.
6. Trumbull Chevrolet Sales Co. v. Maxwell, 142 So.2d 805 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1962), relying, although questionably because there a draft payable in
two days was accepted, on Jeffrey Motor Co. v. Higgins, 230 La. 857, 89 So.2d
369 (1956). See also Flatte v. Nichols, 233 La. 171, 96 So.2d 477 (1957).
7. 255 La. 347, 231 So.2d 347 (1969).
8. See 4 A. CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 805 (1950, Supp. 1964). In LaMourea v.
Rhude, 209 Minn. 53, 55, 295 N.W. 304, 306 (1940), it was said, "The city ex-
acted from the defendants a promise that they should be 'liable for any
damages done to . . . private property' in connection with the work. It is
immaterial that the obligation was also in effect one to indemnify the city
against claims for such damage."
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the parties had contemplated this result notwithstanding the
absence of a direct expression of this intention. The language
finally agreed upon by the parties was consistent with the court's
affirmative conclusion.9 The question considered initially by the
court was whether, in view of R.S. 9:2721 which requires regis-
try of surface leases to affect third parties, a third party can
commit a tort against a verbal lessee and yet be held not liable
because of non-recordation of the lease. On rehearing, the court
found it unnecessary to consider the question because of its find-
ing of a stipulation pour autrui. The question may, therefore,
be counted as an open one.
In keeping with the current tendency toward the better pro-
tection of consumers, a warning worth noticing by manufacturers
of products likely to cause damage or injury was contained in
the opinion in Ducote v. Chevron Chemical Co.10 Holding in
favor of four farmers claiming damages for the loss of crops oc-
casioned by the use of a herbicide prepared by the defendant,
who contended that the plaintiffs had been adequately warned
that "dessication" might occur in using the preparation for the
purpose of "defoliation," the court said, "The sophistication of
modern advertising techniques may well cause the courts to take
a look at the manufacturer's attempt to avoid liability by fine
print warranty limitations appearing in an obscure place on
product labels .... 11
The tendency of the courts to strictly construe provisions
absolving a lessor of responsibility where structural defects are
involved was reflected in Reed v. Classified Parking System.12
Although the parties "specifically agreed that the sub-lessors
(lessors) shall not be liable or responsible for any repairs what-
soever,"' the sub-lessee was held entitled to claim cancellation
because of the serious deterioration of the concrete roof of a
garage.
The supreme court has granted a writ in the case of Ameri-
9. By way of comparison, it was recently held in Evans v. New Hotel
Monteleone, Inc., 233 So.2d 578 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969), that the absence of
recordation of a lease was immaterial with respect to a third person who
had granted permission to the lessee to engage in certain stated conduct.
10. 227 So.2d 601 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
11. Id. at 605.
12. 232 So.2d 103 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970).
13. Id. at 106-07.
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can Creosote Co. v. Springer.4 The important question to be
decided is whether the sale of premises included sub silentio the
sale of rails and angle irons leased by the owner and used by
him in the construction of railroad trackage thereon.
MANDATE
Milton M. Harrison*
A real estate salesman who shows property, which is
unlisted, to a prospective buyer has no right to a fee from the
owner when the sale is ultimately effected between the buyer
and owner. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal held in Shannon
Real Estate, Inc. v. Toll' that the obligation to pay a fee must
come from the consent of the owner and the absence of such
an agreement precludes recovery. However, in Nugent v. Downs,2
a case in which an attorney represented a client without an
agreement with reference to the fee, the Third Circuit Court of
Appeal held that the attorney was entitled to a fee based on
quantum meruit. In the latter case, however, there was ample
evidence that both attorney and client understood that a fee
would be charged, only the precise amount being undetermined.
In Interior Contractors, Inc. v. Cashen Metal Fabrication,
Inc.8 the defendant alleged in its answer and reconventional
demand that the plaintiff while acting as agent for defendant
engaged in practices which were adverse to the defendant and
which resulted in its loss. More specifically, it was alleged that
the plaintiff acted for and on behalf of defendant's competitor.
The court of appeal found that the agency relationship which
had existed between plaintiff and defendant had come to an end,
that the defendant had refused to agree to continue it and that,
therefore, plaintiff's representing adverse interests was not a
violation of the fidelity owed by plaintiff to the defendant.
Clearly, had the evidence supported the existence of the agency
relationship, plaintiff's representation of interests adverse to
defendant would have been a violation of its obligations under
the mandate.
14. 232 So.2d 532 (IL. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
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1. 223 So.2d 693 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969).
2. 230 So.2d 597 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970).
3. 231 So.2d 708 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970).
